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This paper explores unexpected and precarious uses of the constitutional rigidity level. In doing so, it shall reveal that there is more in the misuse of constitutional amendment rates than meets the eye, and that the stakes may be high when the conclusions drawn aim at offering criteria to constitutional designers. The first part probes why the longstanding question about the economic effects of constitutions appears to have acquired renewed importance and examines the use of empirical methodology and the persuasive capacity of metrics in explaining constitutional change and in setting constitutional design aims. The second part addresses the assertion that long constitutions harm the economy and are thus bad constitutions, as their frequent amendments suggest, pinning down the fallacies underlying such approaches. Different correlations are explored casting doubts on the neutrality of the empirical finding that long constitutions are bad and it is explained why frequent amendments cannot be used as an indicator of bad constitutional quality. The third and final part explains why cutting out words from the Constitution is not a neutral task and explores criteria of constitutional quality.
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Perspectives on Politics
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A paradigm shift has recently occurred in the study of constitutional change. A fundamental change in the basic concepts and the methodology through which constitutional amendment is approached is becoming conspicuous. A few years back, constitutional change was understood at the national level, mainly through the study of the amendment formula and the rigidity level it aimed to establish. The growth of comparative constitutional law, the focus placed on constitutional change encompassing both formal and informal change, the application of quantitative research methodologies, and the experimental attempts to enhance popular participation in formal constitutional amendment triggered by the financial crisis mark a move away from the traditional paradigm. The shift in the study of comparative constitutional amendment has the characteristics of a scientific revolution as described by Thomas Kuhn. Constitutions are understood through the way they change and constitutional change is understood through different perceptions of the Constitution.
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This is the 3rd edition of The International Review of Constitutional Reform (ISBN: 978-1-7374527-4-4). The International Review of Constitutional Reform (IRCR) is a first-of-its-kind scholarly effort to gather jurisdictional reports--written by scholars and judges, often in collaboration--on all forms of constitutional revision around the world over the past year. This edition contains over 80 jurisdictional reports. Each report explains and contextualizes events in constitutional reform over the previous year in a given jurisdiction. Constitutional reform is defined broadly to include constitutional amendment, constitutional dismemberment, constitutional mutation, constitutional replacement and other events in constitutional reform, including the judicial review of constitutional amendments. In order to facilitate cross-jurisdictional comparison, all reports follow the same format: • “INTRODUCTION,” which offers a brief overview of the year in constitutional reform; • “PROPOSED, FAILED, AND SUCCESSFUL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS,” which examines proposed constitutional reforms and explains the reasons for their failure or success; • “THE SCOPE OF REFORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL,” which evaluates the proposed reforms and explains whether they were the subject of constitutional review; • “LOOKING AHEAD,” which identifies the big questions that await the jurisdiction in the context of constitutional reform in the year or years ahead; and • “FURTHER READING,” which recommends relevant readings for those interested in learning more about the reforms discussed in the report. The IRCR is a joint initiative of the Program on Constitutional Studies at the University of Texas at Austin in partnership with the International Forum on the Future of Constitutionalism. The Co-Editors of this new resource in the study of constitutions have worked closely with an outstanding team of Associate Editors: Elisa Boaventura, Maria Letícia Borges, Bruno Cunha, Matheus Depieri, Júlia Frade, and David Sobreira. We thank each of them for their invaluable contributions to this project. We also thank Simon Renwick for his innovation, precision, and vision in designing this book. And most of all we thank our contributors for their outstanding reports.
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Annual Conference of the ISNIE (International …
This paper develops and empirically tests a theory of the impact of political institutions (presidentialism, federalism and proportional representation) on the stability of democratic regimes. The paper first introduces a complete model describing how the .
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When constitutional actors choose institutional rules, they do so following the very rational assumption that they can predict the future outcomes of the application of these rules. However, failures to predict the whole range of all possible outcomes seem inevitable in rational decisions, since unintended consequences seem to be co-substantial to institutional choice. Within constitutions, the design of specific rules for amendment is particularly important since it is perceived that the amendability defines the stability of the system. Leaving aside the weight of contextual factors (such as historical and cultural factors), actors will choose a procedure trying to calculate whether the rules permit to amend the constitution. This decision derives from beliefs on the necessity to protect minorities, not to bound living generations to the will of passed ones, etc.
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SSRN Electronic Journal
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The National Law School of India Review (NLSIR)
Many countries in the modern world face constitutional changes. Sometimes these changes are related to the formation of a new political system, the transformation of a democracy, or changes in consolidated democracies. Constitutional amendments are a very complex issue, and many important circumstances need to be taken into account in their implementation. Richard Albert’s book is the latest brilliant and complex study that shows countries the way in which constitutional amendments should be drafted, adopted, implemented, and under what conditions this process should be based. Richard Albert expresses the great importance of constitutional change for modern liberal constitutionalism in one important sentence– “[a]constitution and rules for its amendment are like a lock and key: one can hardly work without the other”.
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